Like the sailors of old, the government contracting community ventures forth knowing full well that danger lies ahead – although fortunately not in the form of a kraken, leviathan, or other mythical sea monster.  Rather, these perils and risks are embedded in sweeping new regulations that, like an unseen reef, will be arriving and taking effect all too quickly.  On July 14, 2020, the FAR Council published a long-awaited (or perhaps long-dreaded) Interim Rule implementing Section 889(a)(1)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 (Section B).  Effective August 13, 2020, Section B prohibits executive agencies from “entering into, or extending or renewing, a contract with an entity that uses any equipment, system, or service that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system.”  Unlike its counterpart, Section 889(a)(1)(A) of the NDAA for FY 2019 (Section A), which prohibits agencies from “procuring or obtaining equipment or services that use covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component or critical technology,” the restrictions of Section B go far beyond the immediate contract between the contractor and the government.  Instead, Section B directs contractors to discontinue any and all use of covered telecommunications equipment or services.  Even accounting for the choppy seas caused by the ongoing pandemic, the exceedingly broad scope of Section B promises sharp, jagged, and uncharted hazards to contractors attempting to implement compliant policies and procedures.

Continue Reading Risks, Reefs, and Wrecks: Charting a Course Through the Perils of Covered Telecommunications Equipment and Services

For several years, we have witnessed the emergence of a statutory and regulatory framework to tighten controls on the export of emerging and critical technology, as well as the review of inward foreign investment into said technology. As was evident in the listing of Huawei and other Chinese technology giants, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to use alternative punitive measures against China. Whether the desired impact of this approach has been achieved is difficult to determine. We have, nevertheless, no reason to believe that the tide will ebb in 2020.

Continue Reading Export Controls and Global Trade: A Forecast and the Year in Review

As we stated last month, further restrictions are afoot on the use of Chinese technology in federal acquisitions. An Interim Rule issued by the Department of Defense (DoD), General Services Administration (GSA), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (collectively, the “FAR Council”) implements the first phase of Section 889 of the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The Interim Rule, effective August 13, 2019, broadly prohibits federal agencies, federal contractors, and grant or loan recipients from procuring “covered telecommunications equipment or services” produced by Huawei Technologies Company and ZTE Corporation and, with respect to certain public safety or surveillance applications, Hytera Communications Corporation, Dahua Technology Company, and Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company. In particular, federal suppliers are prohibited from sourcing “substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system” from the foregoing companies.

Continue Reading Know Your Supplier: Effective August 13, 2019, Certain Chinese Telecoms Banned From Federal Procurement